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I. INTRODUCTION
The growth in the computer software industry continues to be driven
by intense competition for product sales. This competition requires that
one constantly produce a better product than one's competitor. But,
sometimes, the competitor simply has a better idea. There is no doubt
that this idea has a unique original expression in the original work of
the author. In addition, the author's original work has a "Look and
Feel."
The wise competitor incorporates the idea in his product and, if at
all possible, improves upon the idea. However, during the time the
competitor is producing his competing product, the "Look and Feel"
of the competitor's product is quickly becoming second nature to users.
Thus, the competitor is faced with a dilemma: should he give his
separately created product a new "Look and Feel," risking loss of sales
to those users who do not wish to learn another new program,' or
should he emulate the original "Look and Feel" in his new, improved
program. If he does incorporate the other program's "Look and Feel"
in his independent creation, the good faith competitor has used his
competitor's idea. The non-literal, non-copyrighted "Look and Feel"
should not be a bar to the public good that results from the competition.
Copyright law is a protection of two desirable ends that are often
competing. The author has the right to the protection and the economic
benefit of his work. Copyright protection, however, is not a protection
in the abstract of an author's inherent rights. It has always been a right
given to the author by the sovereignty, invariably underlain by the desire
of the sovereignty to promote social innovation.2 But tension occurs
Copyright 1990, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. Today, many people are switching from their old word processor to Word-
Perfect.TM There is no doubt that WordPerfect is a tremendously useful program, but the
learning curve and text file translations are a significant problem. (WordPerfect is a
registered trademark of WordPerfect, Inc.).
Having used no less than ten editors and word processors in my years, I cast a vote
for a doctrine of computer software genericism as a reasonable limitation on the copyright
protection of computer programs. See L. Burgunder and C. Heckman, An Emerging
Theory of Computer Software Genericism, 2 High Tech. L.J. 229 (1988) [hereinafter
Genericism].
2. See infra text cited in notes 174-78.
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when the protection that the author seeks from copyright law results in
a virtual "monopoly" of a useful idea. Copyright law has always ex-
tended protection to the author against the infringement of his unique
expression. In the area of literary expression, there has been a persistent
tolerance for the adaptation of idea from one work to another in
recognition that one author's expression has rights of protection only
to the extent that it remains his expression of an idea and not the idea
itself.
A. What is "Look and Feel"?
The computer user would likely describe a computer program3 by
the things that it displays on the screen and by the printed output which
3. A computer program is defined as "a set of statements or instructions to be
used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result." 17
U.S.C. § 101 (1988). A computer program is both similar and dissimilar to other types
of literary works, the classification to which computer programs are relegated by copyright
law. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) provides in part:
"Literary Works" are works, other than audiovisual works, expressed in
words, numbers, or other verbal or numerical symbols or indicia, re-
gardless of the nature of the material objects, such as books, periodicals,
manuscripts, phonorecords, film tapes, disks, or cards, in which they are
embodied.
It is the similarities and especially the differences that have made the second generation
cases so difficult to resolve by means of conventional copyright analysis. The courts
frequently look to audio-visual works without any overt explanation for using these cases
instead of the literary works cases. One might surmise that it is logical since, for the
most part, humans interact with computer programs through sight, sound, and keyboard
or mouse contact.
In many articles on the general topic of computer programs, and in most of the cases
cited herein, specialized jargon has been routinely relegated to footnotes for optional
perusal by the interested reader. It is ironic that courts and writers routinely give great
effort to the precision in terms of legal art and pronouncements of the law, but routinely
give an intellectual shrug to the science with which they deal. Computer science, not
unlike the law, has its own jargon, often composed of common words that are really
terms of art. "As the CONTU Report itself recognized, the distinction between copy-
rightable computer programs and uncopyrightable process ... do not always seem to
'shimmer with clarity.' . . . The witnesses had the not uncommon difficulty of finding
the precisely correct words of description in this field." Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin
Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 n.8 (3d Cir.), reh'g and reh'g en banc denied, cert.
dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033, 104 S. Ct. 690 (1984), quoting the CONTU Report at page
18. See supra note 135 for a discussion of the CONTU Report.
The fact that this is science makes precision in the court's exploration of this science
as important as the attention given the precision in applying the law. The failure, in
general, of the courts to recognize this truism has resulted in the development and reliance
upon precedent that may be of questionable quality for lack of analysis of the underlying
object and its unique place in our economy.
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it produces. Screen displays and printed output are the program's user
(or observer) perceptible manifestations. 4 There is nothing unique in
screens or printouts. They may be reproduced with great exactness by
an infinite variety of programs.' User perceptible manifestations char-
acteristic of a particular computer program are referred to as the pro-
gram's "Look and Feel." 6
An example is that of the WYSIWYG, 7 or full screen editor used
in. all modern word processing programs. The first editors that appeared
on personal computers were so called "line-editors" which allowed the
viewing and editing of a document on a line-by-line basis, but the viewer
had no idea what the final result would look like until a copy was
printed. The advent of the full screen editor, where the user could freely
move about the screen making changes immediately seeing the results,
was a boon to the commercial use of computers. The advent of the
full screen editor resulted in the virtual demise of line editors. The issue
was never raised that every subsequent program that used full screen
editing was infringing on this new "Look and Feel." '
"Look and Feel" has come to imply that user (or observer) per-
ceptible manifestations of a computer program may be copyrightable
features. Furthermore, substantial similarity of program attributes in a
competing product may be strong indicia of copyright infringement.
While the latter is not necessarily an incorrect conclusion in certain
situations, outside of those situations the concept could potentially allow
the judicial expansion of copyright protection beyond the scope of the
basic purpose of the statutory scheme, which is to promote the pro-
4. Sometimes called the "user interface." Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Phoenix Control
Systems, Inc., 886 F.2d 1173, 1175 n.3 (9th Cir. 1989).
5. For the computer programming aspects of this paper, the author draws on 19
years of professional computer programming on a variety of computers and in a variety
of computer languages, including FORTRAN and BASIC.
It is not necessary for a programmer to see the actual source code, see infra note 23
to recreate user perceptible manifestations. This recreation may be done simply by writing
new source code that reproduces that which is seen on the screen. The internal operation
of the program that yields these "clone" manifestations may be, and usually would be,
completely different from the original, but this difference would not likely be noticeable
to the observer.
6. While the term "Look and Feel" in computer software related cases sometimes
is used to include other elements, such as file structure, subroutine organization, and
other factors, the screen displays and printed output are generically recognized as "Look
and Feel."
7. WYSIWYG is an acronym for What You See Is What You Get.
8. Whether or not the results would be the same today if the full screen editor
were created in 1990 may be in some doubt. In fact, the relative success of "Look and
Feel" cases is being touted as a possible reason for Apple's suit against Microsoft and
Hewlett-Packard over the use of icon driven screens. Apple Computer v. Microsoft Corp.,
717 F. Supp. 1428 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
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duction of the public good while protecting the economic value of the
author's work. 9
Since the early 1970s, the subject of copyright protection for com-
puter programs has been a matter of intense interest in the computer
industry, the courts, and academic circles. (This interest has tracked the
advances in integrated circuit technology.) It became apparent to persons
aware of the amazing progress of the infant integrated circuit industry
that. the world was about to change dramatically-that the computer
would soon be a household item.'0
As is true of most infant industries, the computer software industry
was led by hundreds of cottage-shop entrepreneurs, in this case-pro-
grammers. As the number of personal computers exploded in the early
1980s, due chiefly to the introduction of the IBM PC, the computer
program market blossomed into one of enormous economic potential.
A computer program potentially could be sold to millions of PC users,
which led to an avid interest in any and all methods of ownership
protection of the computer programs.
It was generally acknowledged by experts in the field of copyright
law that a computer program had some type of intellectual property
protection, but no one was certain whether that protection would be
patent, trade secret, copyright, or sui generis." In 1976 and 1980,
Congress changed the copyright laws to include computer programs.'2
Although computer programs were then protected by the Copyright Act
("the Act"), the war was yet to be fought over the degree and scope
of that protection.
Today, fourteen years later, the "Look and*Feel" decisions have
raised grave concerns in the industry over the use of any aspect of a
competing product in a new program. A large amount of litigation has
spawned as program copyright owners seek to assert their right not to
have the "Look and Feel" of their product mimicked by others. The
concern was brought into focus by the decision in Whelan v. Jaslow,'3
and, in particular, by the opinion's language that "structure," "se-
quence," and "organization" could be copyrightable.
The debate over the nature and scope of "Look and Feel," and
the ultimate implications should the doctrine be validated.by the U.S.
9. U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8, cl. 8;'M. Nimmer and D.. Nimmer, 1 Nimmer on
Copyright § 1.03 (1989).
10. See infra note 33.
11. National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works, Final
Report (1979) [hereinafter "CONTU"].
12. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) provides in part that "[a] 'computer program' is a set
of statements or instructions to be used directly or indirectly in a computer in order to
bring about a certain result."
13. 609 F. Supp. 1307 (E.D. Pa. 1985) (Whelan 1), aff'd, 797 F.2d 1222 (3d. Cir.
1986) (Whelan I), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031, 107 S. Ct. 877 (1987).
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Supreme Court, has continued in legal, computer, and business litera-
ture, '4 as well as in subsequent court decisions. The responses to Whelan
have ranged from articles expressing regret for the end of the clone era
of software to the "business as usual" attitude of software producers
who continue to produce new programs oblivious to the uproar resulting
from Whelan.
This comment begins with a brief look at the elements of a copyright
infringement case and then focuses on two early computer copyright
cases, Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co.'5 and
Whelan v. Jaslow.'6 Some subsequent cases are then briefly examined.
This author contends that the underlying equities in almost all com-
puter program copyright infringement cases are a driving factor in the
decisions. The court is really protecting good faith in the development
of competing products and using copyright law to make bad faith parties
"pay their way." This comment suggests that the same result may be
accomplished by the proper allocation of burdens of persuasion in "Look
and Feel" cases without non-literal elements of a computer program
being elevated to something which they are not, i.e., protected works
in and of themselves.
14. Partial Listing of Sources Discussing "Look and Feel" Law. Case Reports: Whelan
Associates, Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratories Inc., Dentcom Inc., Edward Jaslow and
Joseph M. Cerra, 6 Computer Law & Practice 70 (1986). Copyright Suit Hinges on Design
Limitations, Computerworld, Feb. 12, 1990 at 7. The Duke Backs Protection, Computer
Reseller News, January 29, 1990 at 99. Hard Road to Software Copyrights, Insight on
the News, Feb. 19, 1990 at 54. News-Update, ComputerWorld 2, July 1989. Notes from
the Underground: Close Encounters of the Illrd Kind, 7 Data Based Advisor 178 (1989).
Software Copyright a Mixed Bag, Computerworld, Feb. 12, 1990 at 35. Xerox Tells Apple
to Pay Up, Computer Reseller News, December 25, 1989 at 2. R. Abramson, Look and
Feel, I Case & Comment 3 (1990). L. Burgunder and C. Heckman, An Emerging Theory
of Computer Software Genericism, 2 High Tech. L.J. 229 (1988). L. Fisher, News &
Review, Software Creativity Stifled by Patents, Companies Say, ComputerWorld 29, July
1989. R. Hinckley, NEC v. Intel: Will Hardware Be Drawn into the Black Hole of
Copyright?, 3 Santa Clara Computer & High Tech. L.J. 23 (1987). H. Pearson, Second
Thoughts on "Look and Feel" Copyright Protection for Software, 3 Computer Law &
Practice 155 (1987). S. Peterson, Ashton-Tate President Calls for Software Law, Computer
System News, May 22, 1989 at 4. G. Schumann, Copyrightability of Computer Programs
and the Scope of Their Protection under the ITC Apple Case and the Whelan Case, 2
Computer Law & Practice 109 (1988). G. Schumann, Copyrightability of Computer Pro-
grams and the Scope of Their Protection under the ITC Apple Case and the Whelan
Case-Part II, 3 Computer Law & Practice 141 (1988). M. Sutton, Equities, Evidence,
and the Elusive Scope of Copyright Protection for Software, 10 3.. Pat. & Trade Off.
Soc'ty 551 (1987). Note, Defining the Scope of Copyright Protection for Computer
Software, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 497 (1986). Note, The New Look and Feel of Computer
Software Protection, 29 Ariz. L. Rev. 280 (1988). Note, The Public Interest and the Right
to Copy Nonfunctional Product Features, 19-Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 317 (1977).
15. 462 F. Supp 1003 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
16. See supra note 13.
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This shifting of burdens will remove the incentive for the courts to
make decisions at raised levels of abstraction in order to achieve equitable
results. It will also put the burden of persuasion on the defendant to
demonstrate that he did produce a competing work in good faith by
independent efforts. Such an allocation of the burdens of persuasion
serves the purpose of copyright law in promoting the public good and
still provides protection to the program author for his work. 7
B. Copyright Infringement
A case of copyright infringement is based upon an unauthorized
reproduction of a protected work.'" The plaintiff demonstrates his prima
facie case by proof (1) that he has a valid, registered copyright and (2)
that the defendant copied the work protected by the copyright registra-
tion. 9 A copyright registration certificate is prima facie proof of the
validity of a copyright.2 0 Since proof of copying by direct evidence is
not always possible, copying may be proved through inferential evidence
by showing that the defendant had access to the protected work and
that the alleged infringing work is substantially similar to the copyrighted
work. 2
17. An underlying premise in this comment is that the proper analysis of the scope
of copyright protection for computer programs cannot be performed by the courts without
a better understanding of computer programs. Analogies to non-computer literal works,
audio-visual works, and other extrinsic sources in an attempt to resolve these difficult
cases have led the courts to reach otherwise fair results by strained arguments.
Perhaps the courts are beginning to understand this point. See Johnson Controls, Inc.
v. Phoenix Sys., Inc., 886 F.2d 1173 (9th Cir. 1989) (court appointed an expert as a
special master under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 53 to consider the technical issues
in the case.); NEC Corp. v. Intel Corp., (N.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 1989) (1989 WL 67434)
(While not appointing a special master, Judge Gray had the litigants spend about six
weeks educating him on software, firmware, and the topic of the case-microcode.)
18. 17 U.S.C. § 501 (1988).
19. Whelan H, 797 F.2d at 1231.
20. 17 U.S.C. § 410(c) (1988).
21. Whelan II, 797 F.2d at 1232. Literal Copying: One may misappropriate a computer
program by literally copying the program. E.g., photocopying its printed form or using
the computer itself to place a copy of the source code onto a disk, tape, or in some
manner cause the source code to be transmitted by wire to another computer. This gives
the copier the author's original work, including his comments, and makes program structure
readily apparent. In this literal form, the computer program is at greatest risk of copyright
infringement. It might be infringed by translation or imitation of internal operation of
the original program into a new program. An example of this would be the translation
of a program written in BASIC into DbaseIII. This is only possible when the infringer
has a literal copy, of the original program.
Copying of the object code, while not impossible, would be most cumbersome. Object
code is usually represented by a seemingly random sequence of binary or hexadecimal
numbers that are intelligible to humans only with the greatest of efforts. A binary number
[Vol. 51
NOTES
C. The First Generation Cases-Literal Copying22
First generation cases are those in which the courts dealt with the
copyright of computer program source code" and object code.24 The
is an expression of a number in base 2. A hexadecimal number is an expression of a
number in base 16. These numeric bases as well as base 8 are used in association with
computers because each base is a power of 2. Thus, there is a one-to-one correspondence
to the binary nature of the basic electrical building block of the computer, i.e., the
transistor which has only .two possible operational states, usually denoted as "1" and
"0," which in turn are the only two digits in base 2. (For an example of a court that
tired of the extensive testimony in this "technical" point see footnote 9 in Midway Mfg.
Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. I1. 1983)). Under only the rarest of circumstances
could the author's original expression ever be reconstructed from this "copied object
code." And this, most likely, only if the original language which the author used was
either machine language or assembly language. If the program were written in assembly,
the reverse-engineered product would be the original author's expression less the structure
of his original program, i.e., the order of its components could not be revealed by this
process. Nor would it be possible to recreate the original comments, variable names,
labels, and other mnemonics that the author placed in the assembly language source code.
All of the author's original expressions would be lost in the process of creating the object
code. The structure, original comments, variable names, labels, and other mnemonics of
the original program and the comments are ignored by the program assembler and are
in no way represented by the resultant object code. Finally, if the programmer is writing
a program which requires any sophistication in its operation, the programmer is going
to rely on commercially produced library functions included by the creator of the assembler.
These library functions become inextricably merged with the author's work during the
assembly process. It is thus entirely possible that one could extract a functional portion
of a program from "copied" object code and reverse-engineer that segment with the net
result that the "copier" has only recreated a program function that was written by the
creator of the assembler and is totally unrelated to the work of the author in question.
This would be the functional equivalent of taking a cooked box cake to a chemistry
laboratory to discover how it is made instead of simply reading the contents off the box
label.
Because of the nearly intractable problems of reverse-engineering, "copied" object code
rarely results in anything meaningful or useful. "Copied" object code rarely serves any
use except to run the very same program on a similar computer. The classic example of
this type of copying is when X copies his employer's copy of WordPerfect to use on his
home computer, i.e., simply ripping off a copy to use on another computer. This would
be the form of "copying" with which most people are familiar and the easiest to prove
because the "copied" code is 10007 identical to the original code.
Except on a commercial basis, this is not the common type of copyright infringement
case for computer software. But, regardless of the means of literal copying used, the
thing which is copied is the original literal expression of the author. Although it can also
result in more than the author's original work being copied. There can be no doubt that
this original, literary expression of the author is protected by copyright law as would be
any other printed work. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988) in part states: 'Copies' are material
objects ... in which a work is fixed ... and from which the work can be perceived,
reproduced."
Non-Literal Copying: A computer program may be functionally "copied" by being
rewritten in another computer language, or being "cloned." This is the type of "copying"
19901
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cases usually involved literal copying of the source or object code. The
first generation cases easily reached the reasonable result25 that both the
source code and the object code were protected under the copyright
law.
Under Section 101 of the Act, source afid object code are clearly
material objects in which the author's original work is fixed from which
the work may be perceived or reproduced. 26 Under the Act, based upon
the 1976 and 1980 revisions, they are works of original authorship. 27
The results achieved in these cases required little beyond literal inter-
pretation of the statutes and analogies to existing audio-visual and literary
works case law. However, the difficulty of applying these same statutes
that worked so nicely in the first generation cases became readily ap-
parent in the second generation cases in which there had been no literal
copying.
D. The Second Generation Cases-Non-Literal Copying
Second generation cases had to deal with a much more difficult
issue: the copyright protection afforded to a computer program that
was in some manner "copied," but not literally or directly. 28 The second
generation cases proved to be fraught with difficult conceptual problems,
not the least of which was the nature of a "computer program. ' 29
1. Synercom Technology, Inc., v. University Computing Co.3 0
In 1978, Judge Higginbotham took that first step into the second
generation of computer software copyright cases in Synercom.
that has been the subject of the court cases in the second generation. It is in these
infringement'cases that "Look and Feel" came into the copyright equation.
22. See supra note 21 for a discussion how the concept of copying takes on special
meanings in the context of a computer program.
23. Source code is the original program that the programmer produced.
24. Object code is the version of that program into which the source code was
converted to allow execution on a target computer.
25. It was easy to justify this result if on no other grounds than the definition of
"copy," supra note 21, under the Act. That is, the source or object code is that "from
which the work can be perceived [or] reproduced." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
26. Id.
27. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
28. For the statutory definition of "a copy" see supra note 21. The difference between
statutory definition of a "copy," a term of art, and the vernacular use of the word
"copy" seem to lead both the court and commentators into problematical analyses. See
text supra note 21 for a discussion of "copying" in the computer context.
29. Other courts have dealt with the nature of programs that reside in the memory
of the computer, 'programs that randomly change themselves, programs that control the
operation of the computer chip itself. Accord NEC Corp. v. Intel Corp., (N.D. Cal.
1989) (1989 WL 67434) (microcode).
30. 462 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
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Synercom developed a computer program, STRAN,3 ' which per-
formed structural analysis. STRAN was based on an earlier public
domain 2 program FRAN, developed by IBM and improved by the
subsequent founders of Synercom while employed at McDonnell Douglas
Automation Company ("McAuto").33 After leaving McAuto on a friendly
basis, the founders of Synercom created STRAN using IBM's public
domain information, McAuto improvements in the program user's man-
ual, and their own expertise. Unlike IBM and McAuto, Synercom at-
tempted to retain proprietary rights in STRAN by copyright registration
and proper notice on the user's manual.
After a brief attempt to market the program through a Houston
firm, Bonner and Moore, Inc. ("Bonner"), Synercom decided to market
STRAN through University Computing ("UCC"). Meanwhile, Bonner
acquired an engineering consulting firm (EDI) in New Orleans.
Bonner proposed to John Fowler and his firm, EDI,3 4 that EDI
manage the newly acquired engineering consulting firm. They planned
to develop a structural analysis computer program to compete with
STRAN. The new program, SACS II, was to be completely compatible
with STRAN in order to minimize training and data conversion problems
for customers who switched to SACS II from STRAN. EDI planned
to price SACS II lower than STRAN in order to encourage UCC's
customers to switch to SACS II. Thus, EDI and Bonner planned to
compete with STRAN in the very market that UCC and Synercom had
developed.
31. Acronym for STRuctural ANalysis.
32. Public domain programs are computer programs that are published without a
reservation of copyright. They are fieely copied and distributed with nominal charges at
most for copying expenses, maintenance, or update to future versions.
33. Neither IBM nor McAuto attempted to retain proprietary rights in their programs.
At the time FRAN and STRAN were developed by IBM and McAuto, the decade of
1960, the only computers that were available were mainframes. The PC (personal computer)
revolution was still ten years away. While the processor speed, memory requirements, and
programming language sophistication that such a program would require are available in
a desktop computer in 1990, such a system in the 1960's was beyond the means of nearly
anyone except for large corporations or the government. Thus, it is quite likely that
companies that produced computer programs in this era never even gave thought to
proprietary protection for a program that would only execute on one of their computers.
One study showed that by 1970 there would only be an estimated 100,000 computer
installations in the entire United States. C. Gottlieb and A. Bordin, Social Issues in
Computing 9 (1973). In stark contrast is the data compiled by Computer Reseller News
indicating that for the month of November 1989, the unit sales for PC manufacturers
was 279,700 units. Sussman, The Numbers Sheet-PC Units Sold By Manufacturers,
Computer Reseller News, January 22, 1990 at 14.
34. Upon Boeing New Orleans' closure in 1973, Fowler and another former Boeing
engineer formed EDI (the court's opinion does not indicate if EDI is an acronym). Fowler,
as an employee of Boeing was familiar with SAMECS, another public domain structural
analysis program.
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With this design goal in mind, Fowler created SACS II, using, in
part, as a source of information about STRAN, a copy of a brochure
designed for users of STRAN which had been printed by Bonner while
working with Synercom.35 The brochure was the source of the computer
input card images used by UCC that would become the basis of the
copyright infringement suit filed by Synercom. Both STRAN and SACS
II were designed to accept data in the form of punched data cards.3 6
The requirement that SACS II would accept input data in the same
format as the data on the punched computer cards used by STRAN
was crucial to this plan. EDI wrote a pre-processor program that trans-
lated STRAN formatted data into a SACS II compatible format. Thus,
the STRAN data became accessible to SACS 11.37 Finally, in 1976, the
business relationship of UCC and Synercom began to deteriorate. By
the time Synercom decided not to renew its contract with UCC, UCC
had already contracted with EDI to market SACS IT.
EDI and UCC then distributed an uncopyrighted user's manual along
with SACS II, that contained "mirror images of some of [Synercom's]
input cards and instructions [that] effectively enabled a customer to use
the STRAN input format."3 It was this action that prompted Synercom
to file suit for copyright infringement of their manual and their input
card formats.
a. The Trial Court Decision
Although the trial court resolved four issues, only one is within the
scope of this paper:3 9 did EDI and UCC infringe Synercom's copyright
35. The possession of the brochure by Bonner was probably nothing more than a
vestige of the Bonner-Synercom business relationship. The significance of Fowler's use of
the brochure lies in the inference that the substantial similarity in SACS II was a result
of copying of Synercom's copyrighted works.
36. What we recognize today as those cards that one must never fold, spindle, or
mutilate, were, some say, invented, while others admit at least brought to the forefront
of technology, by Herman Hollerith in the 1880s. These cards, later known as Hollerith
cards, were used in'a crude mechanical computer to. tabulate information in the 1890
Census of the United States. The 1880 census took nearly ten years to complete. With
the Hollerith cards and tabulating machines, the initial population count in the 1890
census was completed in less than a year. The Hollerith card and machine patents were
later sold to a company that would become IBM. G. Austrian, Herman Hollerith-
Forgotten Giant of Information Procesging (1982).
37. The fact that the preprocessor program was written using only the brochure and
Synercom's user manual, without the copying of any portion of Synercom's STRAN
program prevented the program from being a directly infringing work or an infringing
derivative work.
A derivative work is defined as "a work based on one or more preexisting works, such
as translation." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
38. Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003,
1009 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
39. The other issues concerned (1) whether Synercom had any valid copyrights on
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on its input card format?40 The question that was at the heart of
Whelan-whether there was substantial similarity between the protected
work and the alleged infringing work-was not at issue because UCC
had copied the Synercom work literally. 4' The court, finding the issue
res novo, reached into the distant past to find the 1879 copyright case
Baker v. Selden. 41 Selden provided a test which the court could apply
by analogy to solve this novel question.
In Selden, the plaintiff's testator had written a book describing an
innovative method of bookkeeping. The book included blank forms
containing "ruled lines and headings, given to illustrate the system." ' 43
Selden's executor claimed that the forms were secured by the copyright
on the book. 44 Baker, in a subsequent book, included forms similar to
those in Selden's.
Speaking for a unanimous court, Justice Bradley found that Selden's
blank forms were not among the items explicitly enumerated in the
copyright law of 1859. 41 Then Justice Bradley considered whether or not
the blank forms may implicitly fit within the scope of protected works
under the Act. He opined that copyright law protected only the original
works of an author, that is, his expression of an art, in this case a
new method of bookkeeping, but could not invade the "province of
letters-patent" by granting an exclusive right to the art itself."
This holding in Selden has become known as the idea-expression
dichotomy and is generally regarded as being codified in Section 102(b)
of the Copyright Act which states:
In no case does copyright protection for an original work of
authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process, system, method
of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless of the
the manual or the input card formats, (2) the available relief if infringement was found,
and (3) whether or not EDI and UCC competed unfairly. Synercom, 462 F. Supp. at
1009.
40. In an earlier part of the decision, the court tentatively decided that the input
format cards may be copyrightable. This assumption was made to allow the court to
discuss the possible infringement by UCC. This proves to be obiter dictum, but is the
portion of the decision on which the Whelan 11 court would focus.
41. In Whelan this was a material issue since the alleged infringing program was
written in a different language, i.e., it was not copied literally. Whelan II, 797 F.2d at
1225. See text supra note 21 for a discussion of "copying" of computer programs.
42. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. (11 Otto) 99 (1879).
43. Id. at 100.
44. Id. at 100.
45. 'Items then enumerated in the copyright law were books, maps, charts, musical
compositions, prints, and engravings. Id. at 101.
46. Id. at 102.
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form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied
in such a work. 47
The Synercom court, after citing Selden for the proposition that
"blank forms are not the subject of copyright, '48 distinguished later
cases. Courts in cases where the forms were held to be properly copy-
rightable noted that the forms in and of themselves communicated
information of a specific nature.4 9 Drawing the common thread between
these later cases and Selden, the Synercom court expressed a "litmus
test": "whether the material proffered for copyright undertakes to ex-
press." 5 0
Applying this test to the facts before him, Judge Higginbotham
noted that UCC did not actually provide the format cards themselves
(i.e., the blank forms), but instead supplied a description of the card,
in the form of a mirror image printed in their manual. UCC's purpose
was to convey the sequence and order idea contained in the card to
the user of SACS II, rather than to provide the format cards themselves
or the specific information contained in the card image.',
In the simple language of Selden, since the court could find that
only the images of the cards were necessary to convey the idea contained
in the input format cards, then, the cards did indeed communicate or
express. The next question would be whether or not the cards, themselves
expressions, were subject to copyright protection. The court found that
input card formats may be properly copyrightable, if the idea expressed
is separable from the expression.12 If such a separation cannot be found,
then, the expression is not copyrightable under the Selden and Section
102(b) idea-expression distinction. 3
Assuming arguendo that the input format cards were a copyrightable
expression, Judge Higginbotham then considered the fundamental ques-
tion of the separability of the particular expression and the underlying
idea. Judge Higginbotham analyzed the question using a hypothetical
example of an idea-expression merger involving a figure-H pattern of
47. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988). Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 74 S. Ct. 460 (1954);
Data East USA, Inc. v. Epyx, Inc., 862 F.2d 204, 207 n.4 (9th Cir. 1988).
48. Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003,
1011 (N.D. Tex. 1978).
49. Id. at 1011. The cases to which the court was referring were Harcourt, Brace &
World, Inc. v. Graphic Controls Corp., 329 F. Supp. 517 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Reiss v.
National Quotation Bureau, Inc., 276 F. Supp. 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1921) (Code Books);
Hartfield v. Peterson, 91 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1937) (Forms to record answers to multiple
choice tests). See supra text accompanying note 46.
50. Synercom, 462 F. Supp. at 1011.
51. Id. at 1012.
52. Id. at 1012 (emphasis added).
53. See supra text accompanying note 47.
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an automobile gear shift. He noted that although in theory many other
patterns may suffice as a gear shift pattern, once the basic pattern is
chosen, whether purposefully or arbitrarily, "it is the only pattern that
will work in a particular model."15 4 He then analogized this chosen
pattern "to the computer 'format.""'
The Synercom court noted that UCC would be liable for infringement
only if UCC copied the expression and not the idea. Thus, the court
was forced to attempt to articulate the underlying idea of the computer
input format cards. The court noted that "[i]f the sequence and ordering
of data ' 5 6 is the idea, then there was no infringement. On the other
hand, the court queried: "If sequencing and ordering is expression, what
separable idea is expressed?"31 7 This was the very question that would
later perplex the Whelan court.
For the Synercom court, this question was especially bedeviling
because STRAN and SACS II were written in the computer language
FORTRAN.5" FORTRAN variables and data must be precisely defined
in the program, and input data on the punched cards must match this
definition exactly.5 9
54. Synercom, 462 F. Supp. at 1013. One must infer from this statement that the
court meant that once a particular vehicle had a "H-pattern" shift lever, it could not
be shifted by using any other pattern, e.g., a "N" pattern.
55. Id. It appears that Judge Higginbotham was struggling with the same intellectual
difficulties that many courts and commentators have found at the heart of this thorny
legal problem. A computer program is protected by copyright law by virtue of the adoption
of the 1980 amendments to the copyright laws as recommended by CONTU, supra note
11. Without any debate or congressional hearings on the advisability of the CONTU
recommendations, they were enacted, with the result that a computer program (see def-
inition in text supra note 3) became a protected literary work. Thus, there are no universally
recognized sources of authority to guide the courts in the interpretational problems that
result from the application of a body of law that regulates ownership of tangible expressions
of intellectual works to an expression that is basically utilitarian in purpose, not expressive,
and undergoes substantial alteration of form to achieve its intended purpose, i.e., com-
pilation, assembly, linking, or interpretation.
56. Id. at 1013.
57. Id. at 1013.
58. FORmula TRANslation Language. FORTRAN was an early development in com-
puter languages.
It was developed specifically for use in problems encountered in scientific and engineering
fields which required use of multi-dimensional arrays, trigonometric, logarithmic, expo-
nential, hyperbolic, and complex number functions. The only other programming languages
commonly available at that time were COmmon Business Oriented Language (COBOL),
which did not support any of these required functions, and assembly language, which
although, in theory could support all of the FORTRAN type. functions, would require
Herculean efforts for each and every simple task that FORTRAN handles routinely.
59. Thus, the input format card, usually 100 characters wide, is strictly defined in
terms of what columns are to be used for what data.
The program accepting the data from these cards would contain these same definitions
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The crucial feature of the input card in Synercom was that the card
itself literally provided the sequence and order in which the data had
to appear in order to function with STRAN or SACS II.6 To the trained
eye of a FORTRAN programmer or perhaps a sophisticated user, the
image of the input format card would reveal this critical pattern of
sequence and ordering as if one were looking at the program author's
original FORTRAN source code program. More importantly, the input
format cards in and of themselves provide no other information except
this sequence and ordering.6'
Thus, the input card image really conveys the underlying idea of
the necessary sequencing, ordering, and nature of the underlying program
variable62 required by the FORTRAN program, and the particular ex-
pression conveys nothing beyond this.6 3
Once the court concluded that the input cards had the idea and
expression inseparably encoded, the court simply needed to point out,
as did the Selden court, that the purpose of copyright law is to protect
the particular expressions of an author from unauthorized copying when
the copying has the purpose of misappropriating the particular expres-
sion. Had UCC copied a deck of input format cards for the purpose
of obtaining specific data on those cards, then the Synercom court would
surely have found infringement.
Such was not the case. Here, UCC simply conveyed the underlying
idea of the sequence and order, an idea inseparable from the expression
of the input format card. Thus the court found the input cards were
not infringed even if presumptively copyrightable because UCC conveyed
the idea contained and not the particular expression. Alternatively, the
court held that if UCC copied the particular expression, the cards were
in order that it could properly parse the information provided by the card. This information
in its raw state would be nothing more than 100 alphanumeric characters standing side-
by-side. The FORTRAN program, via the input card format definitions written into the
program, would divide this mass of information into the separate pieces of data and
insert the data into the appropriate variables for use in its internal calculations.
60. In this respect the input format cards sub judice are no, different from those
used in any other FORTRAN program.
61. See Appendix A for a description of a FORTRAN input card format.
62. Judge Higginbotham did not recognize this additional feature of the input cards,
but this additional detail simply adds support to the argument that the information that
the card really conveys is not that which is .printed on it, but the underlying idea.
63. This conclusion presumes that the copying of the input card format is not for
the specific purpose of getting the exact data entered onto this card. Such copying may
be a violation of copyright law. This would turn in part on the issue of whether or not
this expression was an original work within the meaning of the Copyright Act, or simply
a non-copyrightable utilitarian work.
Note also, that the lack of copyright protection does not prevent assertion of common
law, state, and other federal causes of action, e.g., common law copyright, trade secrets,
unfair trade practices, or anti-trust.
[Vol. 51
NOTES
not copyrightable because the idea was inseparable from the expression. 4
The analogy, although sufficient for the purpose of guiding the
court's decision that input format cards are not copyrightable, reflects
a general conceptual problem troubling the courts in computer software
related cases.
Like other courts that have grappled with the problem of the idea-
expression distinction in computer related cases, the Synercom court used
a hypothetical involving a tangible physical concept as an analytical aid.
There is a natural inclination to use this type of analysis as one attempts
to comprehend an unfamiliar, intangible concept. However, tangible
hypotheticals are only a substitute for understanding the nature of the
works being claimed as protected by the Act, in this case, a computer
input format card. The court could have accomplished the same purpose
by noting that the idea of sequence and order found in a computer
input card format is highly analogous to the idea of sequence and order
found in a sequence of numbers.
An example, of such an analogy would be the partial sequence of
numbers: 0, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 12, 14. The sequence, ordering, and the
precise formula, or idea, is readily apparent from this literal expression
and the idea is inseparable from the expression. 6 From any part of this
infinite sequence, whether it be the first eight numbers or the ninth
through the fifteenth, any other part of the sequence can be derived.
Thus, this numeric sequence, as does any non-random numeric sequence,
demonstrates how in a "literary" expression the particular expression
might well embody the idea in an inseparable manner.
The analogy of a sequence that contains an idea from which any
part of the sequence may be derived is conceptually nearer to that of
the computer input format card, and functions without the risk of
confusion between the idea expressed in a physical object and the object
itself. For example, one could easily conceive of an "H-stick" that
would operate in an "H" pattern, but the "H" pattern would be subject
to an infinite variety of artistic expressions. One need only reflect on
the number of fonts or type styles that man has derived for the Roman
alphabet in 2000 years. However, the sequence of numbers, like the
input format cards, is a pure expression of the idea. There are no further
variations allowable without the loss of the idea.
The important idea derived from Synercom is that sequence and
ordering are important in deciding whether certain types of literary works
may be copyrightable and, as expanded by Whelan, in deciding if a
protected work has been infringed. Synercom also reinforces the necessity
64. Synercom, 462 F. Supp. at 1012-14.
65. This sequence represents the value of the expression x = 2n, where n is an
integer with the values n = 0 to 7.
1990]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
of finding an idea-expression dichotomy in the alleged infringed ex-
pression as a prerequisite to a recovery for infringement. With these
two Synercom elements, the stage was now set for Whelan.
2. Whelan v. Jaslow
In Whelan v. Jaslow,66 the Third Circuit was squarely presented
with the issue of determining an appropriate test for copyright infringe-
ment of a non-literally copied computer program. Specifically, the court
had to decide whether evidence of substantial similarity of plaintiff's
copyrighted computer program and defendant's alleged infringing pro-
gram would be the appropriate test. 67
In 1978, Rand Jaslow 68 ("Rand") purchased a small personal
computer69 and attempted to teach himself how to program the computer
in BASIC. 70 After a few months of unsuccessful efforts, Rand abandoned
his efforts and hired Strohl Systems, Inc. ("Strohl") to develop a custom
designed dental lab program. Elaine Whelan, a co-owner and employee
of Strohl, was assigned as systems analyst and programmer. As part of
her task as systems analyst, she produced extensive design' documentation
on the contents, structure, and logic of the program from which she
eventually created the program "Dentalab. ' '71 The program that resulted
was written in EDL.72
66. Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratories, Inc., 797 F.2d 1222 (3d
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1031, 107 S. Ct. 877 (1987).
67. Whelan II, 797 F.2d at 1225.
68. Defendants in Whelan were Jaslow Dental Laboratories, Inc., Edward Jaslow
(Rand's father), Rand Jaslow, and Dentcom, Inc. Edward and Rand were officers and
shareholders in Jaslow Dental Laboratories, Inc. and Dentcom, Inc. In addition, Joseph
Cerra and Edward Mohr participated in the formation of Dentcom, Inc. Whelan II, 797
F.2d at 1226, 1227 and n.6.
69. Rand "purchased . . . a small, relatively expensive computer, a TRS-80, that had
no printer and limited capacity." Whelan I, 609 F. Supp. at 1309.
70. BASIC is an acronym for Basic All-Purpose Symbolic Instructional Code, a
language created by Professors John Kemeny and Thomas Kurtz of Dartmouth College
in the 1960's for the purpose of instructing students in the art of programming computers.
Because of its ease of use and simplicity in command structure, BASIC has been a
programming mainstay in the small business and personal computer market. It has only
been in the last 10 years that languages such as Pascal and C have begun to make
significant inroads in the small computer market as programmers and program development
tools have become more sophisticated.
71. Both the district court and the appellate court noted the extensiveness of the
documentation produced by Whelan and the tremendous time she devoted to the project.
Whelan II, 797 F.2d at 1231, 1237, and Whelan I, 609 F. Supp. at 1319. This was
apparently in response, in part, to a claim by Rand that he was co-owner of the program
due to his close association with Whelan as she developed the program. The appellate
court makes a point to state that the "coding process is a comparatively small part of
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Whelan left Strohl in late 1979 to form Whelan Associates, Inc.,"
later negotiating the purchase of all rights and title in the EDL version
of Dentalab from Strohl. 74 In early 1980, she contracted with Jaslow
Lab and Rand to be her sales representatives for her EDL version of
Dentalab.7 1 However, in mid-1982, Rand sensed that there might be a
lucrative market for a Dentalab-type program written in BASIC to run
on small business computers and began writing such a program. 76 It is
undisputed that while Rand was working on the his BASIC version of
Dentalab" he had access to the source code of the EDL version. 7
After working on the program for nearly a year, 79 Rand, in May
of 1983, notified Whelan that the Lab was terminating the contract.
Further, Rand stated that the Lab had exclusive rights to market Den-
programming." Whelan II, 797 F.2d at 1231, 1237.
This fixation on a point not especially relevant to a copyright infringement claim seems
to be an undercurrent of equity that one finds in nearly all computer program copyright
cases in which there appears to be an element of bad faith on the part of the alleged
infringer.
For a rare case where there appeared to be no bad faith, see Plains Cotton Co-Op v.
Goodpasture Computer Serv., Inc., 807 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 813 F.2d 407,
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 821, 108 S. Ct. 80 (1987) (Although Goodpasture hired some of
Plain Cotton's employees, Goodpasture required signed employment agreements in which
these employees agreed not to breach any confidences of their former employer. Former
Plains Cotton employee Fisher brought a computer diskette to Goodpasture containing
Plains Cotton's program designs. Upon discovering that Fisher had breached his agreement,
Goodpasture fired Fisher, and immediately replaced the one subroutine copied with a
separately developed subroutine. Plains Cotton Co-Op, 807 F.2d at 1258-1259. The court
found no infringement in spite of substantial similarity between the programs because the
market demanded this particular expression. Plains Cotton Co-Op, 807 F.2d at 1262.
72. EDL is an acronym for Event Driven Language, and was an IBM proprietary
programming language that was apparently one of the few possible choices for the IBM-
Series I computer which Strohl had the Lab acquire. EDL is so fundamentally different
from BASIC that there is little or no correspondence between the command sets. Literal
copying of the EDL program would have served no other purpose than allowing it to
be run on other IBM-Series I or EDL compatible computers. Thus, literal copying would
have defeated the avowed purpose of Dentcom to reach the market of dental labs running
small computers that could execute programs written in BASIC. See infra text accom-
panying note 76.
73. Whelan II, 797 F.2d at 1226.
74. Whelan I, 609 F. Supp. at 1310.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Whelan Associates had apparently produced two versions of Dentalab in BASIC,
but one was commercially unsuccessful and the other was not at issue in the case. Whelan
II, 797 F.2d at 1226 n.4.
78. Whelan II, 797 F.2d 1232.
79. Rand's latest programming effort was completed by a professional programmer,
Jonathan Novak, hired by Dentcom in 1983, and the resultant program was named
Dentcom. Whelan 1,.797 F.2d at 1227.
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talab which "contain[ed] valuable trade secrets of Jaslow Dental Lab-
oratory." 0
After completing the Dentcom program, a company formed by Rand
and others began selling Dentcom as a "new version of Dentalab. "
Whelan also continued to sell Dentalab. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc.
filed suit in state court alleging misappropriation of the Lab's trade
secrets.8 2 Whelan responded with a suit in federal court 3 alleging vio-
lation of Whelan's federal copyright,8 4 Pennsylvania's common law on
trademark, federal trademark law," unfair competition, and tortious
interference with contractual relations. The state court action was sus-
pended during the pendency of the federal court claims.
a. The Trial Court Decision
The trial court noted that Strohl had four copyright registration
certificates86 which Whelan purchased. The certificates purported to reg-
ister (1) "Author of entire computer, text," (2) "Computer program
text," (3) "Manual for implementation and installation of computerized
system," and (4) "Manual for use of computer program. "87
In terms of copyright infringement analysis,88 a copyright infringe-
ment claim can only be for the infringement of a protected work. The
only protected works involved were the parts of the program that were
registered. The trial court, however, focused on the user perceptible
manifestation of the program, something not the subject of any of the
copyright registration certificates. In effect, the court merged the un-
80. Whelan II, 797 F.2d at 1222. Two months later, in August of 1983, Edward
and Rand Jaslow, Joseph Cerra, and Paul Mohr formed Dentcom to sell Rand's completed
BASIC program, Dentcom. At this point in the decision, the court dropped a hint of
an implied concern for the equities involved. The court noted that Cerra had been an
employee of Whelan Associates, Inc. until June of 1983. As head of marketing Cerra
had extended contacts with Rand. Then, Cerra resigned from Whelan. Cerra made a
verbal promise to Elaine Whelan that he would not become associated with Rand in any
business ventures. Whelan II, 797 F.2d at 1227 n.6.
81. Id. at 1227.
82. Id. at 1227.
83. 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1988) provides in part that: "(a) The district courts shall have
original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to ...
copyrights .... Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the courts of the states in ...
copyright cases."
84. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
85. Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1988).
86. A copyright registration certificate is prima facie evidence of a valid copyright.
Introduction of such certificate into evidence is the first prerequisite in an infringement
suit in making the plaintiff's prima facie case. See supra text accompanying notes 18-21.
87. Whelan I, 609 F. Supp. at 1312.
88. See supra discussion in text accompanying notes 18-21.
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copyrighted, and perhaps uncopyrightable, physical manifestation with
the protected work.8 9
The trial court found that Whelan was the owner of valid copyrights
on .Dentalab.90 The court then stated the idea-expression dichotomy test 9
and found that the idea underlying Dentalab was a program to manage
a dental laboratory.9 2 The court then found that the expression was the
"manner in which the program operates, controls and regulates the
computer." 93 The only question left for the lower court was whether
Rand's program was a copy of Whelan's. 94
The trial court noted that "Rand Jaslow ... [had] surreptitiously
and without consent of either Strohl or Whelan Associates obtained a
copy of the source code which he utilized in trying to develop a pro-
gram."
95
The conclusion that Rand's program was in fact a copy was primarily
based upon the court's assessment of the testimony of competing expert
witnesses. Whelan's expert, Dr. Moore, testified that because of the
many similarities between Dentcom and Dentalab, "the person who wrote
the Dentcom PC program 'had a thorough knowledge of [Dentalab],
and he used that knowledge to design [] Dentcom [], whether it was a
case of reading [Dentalab] and copy [sic] it over, of course, I don't
know." '96 In noting that the alleged infringing work was written in
BASIC and not EDL, the source language of Dentalab, the court pointed
out that "knowledge and use of the source code in order to make the
conversion from EDL to BASIC is very helpful.'' 97
Furthermore, the Jaslow expert, Mr. Hess, simply testified to the
many differences and similarities between Dentcom and a BASIC pro-
gram written, but unmarketed, by Whelan and Associates. His study
and research was limited to an examination of the source code98 and
89. See infra Appendix D for excerpts from the "Single Registration Rule" prom-
ulgation and some brief comments thereon.
90. Whelan I, 609 F. Supp. at 1320.
91. See supra text accompanying note 47.
92. Whelan I, 609 F. Supp. at 1320.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1315, finding of fact no. 27 (emphasis added).
Novak, after being hired to finish the program, made use of the work done by Rand.
This apparently in spite of the fact that, as the trial court characterizes in finding of
fact no. 35, Rand's work "contained many errors" and "show[ed] a lack of expertise
in computer programming and designing." Whelan I, 609 F. Supp. at 1315. Nonetheless,
this left a substantial portion of the Dentcom program with the taint of program written
at a time when Rand had unauthorized access to Whelan's source code.
96. Id. at 1316 (emphasis added).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1315-16.
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further, Mr. Hess "did not examine the actual operation of any of the
systems in dispute.'"'
One might consider whether the court erred in accepting Dr. Moore's
testimony over that of Mr. Hess. If Mr. Moore made an error in his
comparison, it was in comparing the Whelan BASIC program to the
Jaslow BASIC program. The infringement claim was between the Whelan
EDL program and the Jaslow BASIC program.
As to his examination being limited to the source code, and pre-
sumably the object code, Mr. Hess was in fact examining the protected
work. Whether Mr. Hess observed the program in operation should be
irrelevant, as that might relate to the substantial similarity between the
protected work and the alleged infringing work unless the user perceptible
manifestations of the program were impliedly held to be objects of a
valid copyright.
The Court of Appeals later confessed the difficulty caused by "hav-
ing practically no knowledge of the operation of computers" to judge
which of two experts in a field is more credible.10° Notwithstanding this
difficulty, even the Court of Appeals rejected the testimony of Hess
because "[hie never observed the computer in operation nor viewed the
various screens."'' °
b. The Appellate Court Decision
The Court of Appeals began its analysis with a description of the
elements of a copyright infringement suit302 and then noted that since
no question was raised on appeal as to the ownership of a valid copyright
by Whelan, the only question remaining was whether there had been
any copying of a protected work. Since there was no direct evidence
of copying, Rand's program having been written in a different language
from Whelan's, the task became to determine what evidence is to be
taken as inferential evidence of copying. 03 The court agreed with the
99. Id. at 1316.
100. Id. at 1321.
101. Id. Thus, the court is saying that although it is willing to concede that the screens
are not per se proof of copyright violation, that the one expert who looked only at the
author's original works, the thing protected by copyright law, is less believable because
that was all he examined. This seems to elevate the screens to the level of proof which
the court denied they hold. It is also a reflection of the persuasive strength that the visual
evidence can have even with a jurist who is supposed to be able to blind himself to
irrelevant and prejudicial evidence. See infra text accompanying notes 157-64.
102. See supra text accompanying notes 18-21.
103. This court, as did the lower court, failed to refer to the copyright registration
certificates to determine what objects sub judice were susceptible to proof of a prima
facie case. See supra text accompanying notes 18-21 & 87.
Non-literal copying of computer programs is of necessity proved by inferential evidence.
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trial court that once a valid copyrightable object is found, proof of
copying requires proof of two elements: (1) access to the protected work
and (2) substantial similarity of the infringing work with the protected
work. 104
To determine if there was access to a protected work, the court
had to determine first if there was a copyrightable object, a protected
work, to be infringed. Since the thing allegedly "copied" was not the
source or object code of Whelan's program, but rather its logical struc-
ture, the court asked "whether the structure (or sequence and organi-
zation) of a computer program is protected by copyright law, or whether
the protection of copyright law extends only as far as the literal computer
code."1°5
Noting that the district court had found the non-literal elements of
the program covered by copyright law,' °6 the Court of Appeals affirmed
but with a. different rationale. 07 The trial court found that copyright
Whelan II, 797 F.2d at 1231. For the very things which are protected according to
Synercom and Whelan's interpretation of the Act applied to computer programs are the
source code, the object code, and implicitly, the separable expression contained therein
to the degree that it is separable from its underlying idea. On the surface this would not
seem to extend the protection to structure, sequence, and organization unless these elements
could be shown to be implicitly within the literary works protected by copyright law and
they are separable expressions from the underlying idea.
104. Whelan I, 609 F. Supp. at 1321, Whelan II, 797 F:2d at 1231. The emphasis
here should be on the term protected work, and not its non-copyrighted aspects.
105. Whelan II, 797 F.2d at 1224. In a curious footnote, the court said "[wie use
the terms 'structure,' 'sequence.' and 'organization' interchangeably when referring to
computer programs, and we intend them to be synonymous in this opinion." (emphasis
added). Id. at 1224 n.l.
This footnote exemplifies the author's complaint, see infra Appendix A about the lack
of precision in the usage of terms of art.. Even in the vernacular, I opine that very few
people would use "structure," "sequence," and "organization" as synonyms.
106. Whelan 1, 609 F. Supp. at 1320. The trial court reasoned that copyright protects
the expression of an idea. The expression of the idea contained in a computer program
is "the manner in which the program operates, controls and regulates the computer in
receiving, assembling, calculating, retaining, correlating, and producing useful information
either on the screen,'print-out or by audio communication." Id. But cf. 17 U.S.C. §
102(b) (1988), the idea-expression dichotomy, supra text accompanying note 47.
107. Whelan II, 797 F.2d at 1233. It appears rather that the Court of Appeals was
anxious to get to what it perceived as the real issue in the case, that of the relevance
of substantial similarity in non-literal aspects of a computer program in a case lacking
direct copying..
However, by not rejecting the trial court's conclusion, but rather finding another basis
for the conclusion, the court left a expansive interpretation of copyright law as a precedent
to be used in a case that might not have the equities present in this case. Cf. Digital
Communications Assocs., Inc. v. Softklone Distrib. Corp., 659 F. Supp. 449 (N.D. Ga.
1987). See supra text accompanying note 106. Accord Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Phoenix
Control Sys., Inc., 886 F.2d 1173 (9th Cir. 1989) (granting a preliminary injunction based
on a finding of substantial similarity of two computer programs without any citation of
Whelan or Synercom).
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protection for computer programs exceeded simply the source code and
the object code. It said "the expression of an idea ... in a computer
program is protected ... even though it must be altered ... to be
made adaptable to different types of computers."' 0° With this simple
analysis the trial court immediately began a substantial similarity
analysis.1°9
The Court of Appeals found this first -step of the analysis, that of
finding a valid object of copyright protection, more troubling and spent
a considerable portion of the opinion on this topic. It had to determine
the copyrightability of the "expression" that the trial court had found." 0
It began with the idea-expression distinction"' incorporated into
section 102(b) of the Act. It then posed the critical question as whether
the structure (read "structure, sequence, and organization") of a program
is an idea, which cannot be protected by copyright law, or an expression,
which can be." 2 Acknowledging Judge Learned Hand's comments on
the idea-expression dichotomy, that "the distinction will inevitably be
ad hoc,""' the court attempted to extract from the case law a rule for
this case."'
In Baker v. Selden,' ' the Court of Appeals found a test to distinguish
between idea and expression by looking to the end sought "to be achieved
by the work."'" 6 The court then states the "rule" derived from the
"end sought" test:
In other words, the purpose or function of a utilitarian work
would be the work's idea, and everything that is not necessary
to that purpose or function would be a part of the expression
of the idea."'
Applying this test, the court stated that "[w]here there are various
means of achieving the desired purpose, then the particular means chosen
108. Whelan I, 609 F. Supp. at 1320.
109. Id.
110. See supra text accompanying note 108.
111. See supra text accompanying note 47.
112. Whelan 11, 797 F.2d at 1235. In fact, "[djefendants argue that the structure of
a computer program is, by definition, the idea, and not the expression of the idea." Id.
at 1235.
113. Id. at 1234, quoting from Peter Pan Fabrics, Inc. v. Martin Weiner Corp., 274
F.2d 487 (2d Cir. 1960).
114. Whelan 1H, 797 F.2d at 1234.
115. 101 U.S. (11 Otto) 99 (1879).
116. Whelan II, 797 F.2d at 1236. One cannot help but note this is a standard that
is incredibly flexible. In fact, it is really a fiction. Any court could easily mold the "end
sought" test to fit its concept of the equities of any case.
117. Id. at 1236. See supra text accompanying note 47.
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is not necessary to the purpose, hence, there is expression, and not
idea."'1 s The court supported this concept by citing the greatly limited
copyright coverage given to fact intensive works and scenes a faire. 9
The court then looked to what it perceived to be the underlying
purpose of the idea-expression distinction, "the preservation of the bal-
ance between competition and protection reflected in copyright and
patent law."' 20 Citing the "fact" that "the more significant costs in
developing a computer program are those attributable to developing the
structure and logic of the program," the court decided that its newly
derived rule for the case would best accomplish the end of promoting
this underlying purpose.' 2'
The Court of Appeals applied its rule by looking at whether there
is more than one means of achieving the desired purpose, in the context
of its economic justifications and sense of copyright law purpose. In
applying this immensely flexible rule, the court decided that the idea of
Dentalab was "the efficient organization of a dental laboratory.' '2 2
"Hence, the structure is not a necessary incident to that idea."' 23 But
this bootstrapping observation ignores the question: "structure" of what?
To be copyrightable, the answer must be the structure of the protected
work. 24
It seems clear in retrospect that the court was concerned with one
person appropriating the economic value of the intellectual effort of
another by copying the "Look and Feel" where there was no literal
copying. In support of this concern the court said that "the fact that
it will take a great deal of effort to copy a copyrighted work does not
mean that the copier is not a copyright infringer." 125 In short, as the
court pointed out, "[the] issue ... is simply whether the copyright
118. Id.
119. "[I]ncidents, characters, or settings which are as a practical matter indispensable
.in the treatment of a given topic." Id. The reason that these two forms of expression
are not accorded copyright protection is that to do so "would give the first author a
monopoly on the commonplace ideas behind [them]." Id. at 1236 (emphasis added).
120. Id. In fact, the primary purpose of copyright and patent law is to promote the
public good by affording reasonable protection to the works of authors who in turn are
secondarily favored as individuals. U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 8; M. Nimmer and D.
Nimmer, 1 Nimmer on Copyright §§ 1.02-1.03 (1989).
121. Whelan II, 797 F.2d at 1237.
122. Id. at 1240. One commentator has analyzed the application of "Look and Feel,"
on a scale of abstraction of analysis. Genericism, supra note 1, at 237. As the commentator
points out, the more abstract then idea the court can find, the more likely it will be that
any particular expression will be copyrightable under the Whelan test. Id. at 236.
123. Whelan II, 797 F.2d at 1240.
124. See supra text accompanying notes 18-21.
125. Whelan II, 797 F.2d at 1240.
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holder's expression has been copied." 126 However, this summation of
the "issue" by the court seems to have overlooked the very real pos-
sibility that Synercom addressed, that the expression may not be cop-
yrightable because the idea is inseparable.
The court's constant references to the operation of the computer
program is a reflection of the difficulty of separating the idea from the
expression. 2 7 The court never notes that the copyright registration cer-
tificates cover only certain aspects of the program and specifically do
not cover the screen displays or any other "Look and Feel" element. 2
Instead, the court uses its newly derived "end sought" test in order
to bootstrap sequence, order, and structure 29 into the realm of copy-
rightable non-literal elements of the work. Inherent in this result is the
ultimate conclusion that the idea-expression test must have been met by
this copyrightable object.'30 The Whelan court thus reached a position
in seeming conflict with the results in Synercom.'3'
Recognizing this discrepancy, the Whelan court discussed Synercom
and its results. 3 2 Starting with Synercom's "powerful rhetorical question:
If sequencing and ordering is expression, what separable idea is ex-
pressed?",' 3 3 the Whelan court first examined what it perceived to be
an underlying premise of Synercom. "[T]he premise that there was a
difference between the copyrightability of sequence and form in the
computer context and in any other context, we think . . . is incorrect.' ' 34
The court then pointed out that Congress, despite its awareness of the
''novel set of issues and problems for copyright law" posed by computer
programs, 13  did not make any special provisions for "ordering and
126. Id. In fact, the court's concern for protecting this economic value of the pro-
grammer's efforts drove the decision on the path of requiring that "Look and Feel" be
a protected element of the work.
127. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). Copyright law protects only certain works which are the
expression of an author.
128. See supra text accompanying notes 18-21 and 86-87.
129. See supra note 105 concerning the. court's interchangeable usage of sequence,
order and structure.
130. See supra text accompanying notes 60-64.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 60-64.
132. Whelan 11, 797 F.2d at 1239-1239.
133. Whelan II, 797 F.2d at 1239.
134. Id. at 1240.
135. The 1976 and 1980 changes to the Copyright Act were in large part a result of
the Report of the National Commission on New Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works
(CONTU). The commission's recommendations were accepted almost verbatim into the
Copyright Act without Congressional debate. The Whelan court rejected the CONTU
report as a surrogate legislative history because "the CONTU Report is not binding on
us in this case." This conclusion was based on the courts determination that the only
section of the Copyright Act applicable to this case was Section 102(b), to which the
CONTU Report recommended and Congress made no changes. The court also rejected
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sequencing" in the computer context.'36 Thus, the court held that it had
just answered Synercom's question. The idea was "the efficient organ-
ization of a dental laboratory."'3 Then, because there are many different
programs which may be expressions of this idea, "the structure [of any
particular program] is not a necessary incident to that idea."',
Having "dispatched" the difficult theoretical question, the court
now addressed the second part of the test for proof of copying' by
use of circumstantial evidence, inquiring "whether there was a sufficient
evidence of substantial similarity between the structures of the two
programs. "40
In addressing this question, the court questioned 'whether the sub-
stantial similarity test would even be the appropriate test for copyright
infringement of a computer program that was not literally copied. '41
The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's affirmative answer. '42
Again, reaching into copyright case archives, the Whelan court looked
to a series of audio-visual copyright infringement cases. 14 Based on these
cases, the court decided that in a non-fiction literary work, substantial
similarity of an infringing work with the original work, combined with
access to the original work, was sufficient to prove copying.'"4 Consid-
the defendants' suggestion that the CONTU Report's precepts should guide the court's
decision even if the substantive recommendations were not directly applicable. Whelan II,
797 F..2d at 1241-1242.
But see Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741 n.8 (N.D. II. 1983) ("[I]t is
fair to conclude, since Congress adopted [CONTU's] recommendations without alteration,
that the CONTU Report reflects the Congressional intent.").
136. Whelan II, 797 F.2d at 1240.
137. Id. See supra note 122.
138. Whelan II, 797 F.2d at 1240.
139. See supra discussion of the two-step test for proof of copying by circumstantial
evidence in text accompanying note 104.
140. Whelan II, 797 F.2d at 1225.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1242-48.
143. Id. at 1232. Ferguson v. National Broadcasting, Co., 584 F.2d 111 (5th Cir.
1978); Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562"F.2d 1157
(9th Cir. 1977) (McDonald's infringed upon Krofft's copyrights on its H.R. Pufnstuff
characters in developing its McDonaldLand characters. Evidence showed that there were
preliminary negotiations with Krofft to develop characters for McDonald's which were
terminated upon the pretext that the project had died. Shortly thereafter, the Mc-
DonaldLand characters arrived on the scene, looking, according to the court, substantially
similar to the Krofft originals; Universal Athletic Sales, Co. v. Salkeld, 511 F.2d 904 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 863, 96 S. Ct. 122 (1975); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon,
564 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. II. 1983) (An interesting literal copying case to cite for this
novel application of substantial similarity based upon external manifestation of the com-
puter program because in this case, the defendant admitted to copying the plaintiff's
programs stored in Read Only.Memories (ROM) and evidence showed that 89o of the
program in the defendants ROM's were identical to those of plaintiff's.)
144. Since this was a res novo issue before the court, a standard of review was needed.
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ering these cases as providing a sufficient basis for the use of the
substantial similarity test in this res novo situation, the court adopted
the comprehensive non-literal similarity test from audio-visual works
cases. 41
In this test, the "comprehensive non-literal similarity '[means] a
similarity not just as to a particular line or paragraph or other minor
segment, but [that] fundamental essence or structure of one work is
duplicated in another." ' ""6 This test, drawn from Roth Greeting Cards
v. United Cards Co.,147 was referred to in Sid & Marty Krofft Television
Productions, Inc. v. McDonald's Corp.'48 as "total look and feel" when
describing the similarity between the H.R. Pufnstuff characters and the
McDonaldLand characters, especially Mayor McCheese and H. R. Puf-
nstuff.' 49
Under the facts of Whelan, the Court of Appeals focused nominally
upon three aspects of the program in order to assess the degree of
comprehensive non-literal similarity: the file structures, the screen out-
puts, and five subroutines. 50 An examination of the significance of these
three entities helps to shed some light on the court's efforts to compare
the degree of comprehensive non-literal similarity.
A file structure is the definition of the organization of the stored
data selected by the programmer. Examples in a dental laboratory pro-
gram might be patient files, diagnosis code files, service code files, and
activity files. Each file structure is designed by the programmer in
consultation with the client and generally is a unique expression of the
programmer's decisions on data organization:
That two programs would have the same file structure by accident
is improbable. That a programmer could create an identical file structure
to that of an existing program, without having access to the original
source code, is very likely. In most cases, the file structure is easily
made apparent by keying in some known data and then observing the
One might note with some interest that the court would reach to audio-visual cases to
resolve a question ostensibly relating to a literary work, when there was a large case law
extant on the subject of literary work copyright infringement cases. This may be an
indication, as some critics of computer copyright cases have contended, that copyright is
simply not the proper means of protection for computer programs, without doing a serious
injustice to the law and the notion of protected works.
145. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v. MCA, Inc., 715 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1983)
(13 alleged distinctive plot similarities between Battle Star Gallactica and Star Wars may
be a basis for finding a copyright violation); Sid & Marty Krofft Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's
Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977). Whelan II, 797 F.2d at 1234.
146. The court quoting Professor Nimmer, 3 Nimmer on Copyright § 13.30[A]. Whelan
11, 797 F.2d at 1234 n.26.
147. 429 F.2d 1106 (9th Cir. 1970).
148. 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977).
149. Id. at 1166.
150. Whelan II, 797 F.2d at 1228.
[Vol. 51
NOTES
resultant data file. From this observation the same data file structure
can be created without any knowledge of the original program that
produced the data file. In fact, this same technique is commonly used
by programmers wishing to make their own program compatible with
some other program or, as was the case in Synercom, wishing to create
a conversion program that takes as its input data the data from an
existing data file.
Thus, the similarity of the file structures between the Dentalab and
Dentcom programs is only of legal significance because Rand had access
to the source code.' Access to the source code inferentially raised the
presumption that Rand "copied" the file structures. The expert evidence
offered by the defendants did not in any way refute this presumption.
Instead, the defendants made their stand on the issue that the file
structures, analogous to blank forms, were not copyrightable expressions
under Baker or Section 102(b) of the Act. The court rejected this
argument based upon the cases that held that "blank forms may be
copyrighted if they are sufficiently innovative that their arrangement of
information is itself informative.'1 2
However, in an interesting aside, the Court of Appeals noted that
the testimony of Mr. Hess bore the seeds of an argument that "there
were in fact few possible, efficient, file structures, and that the similarity
in the programs' file structures was therefore neither surprising nor
probative."' 53 The court then opined that "[h]ad defendants offered
more evidence to support their position, our answer might have been
different." 54
The court then turned its attention to the similarity in the screen
outputs. The court conceded immediately that screen outputs are audio-
visual works, that they are covered by different provisions of copyright
law from literary works, and that Whelan was not alleging any in-
fringement with respect to the screen outputs. Without making any
reference to the fact that the four copyright certificates covered things
other than the screen outputs, and notwithstanding the lack of any
copyright claim on the screens, the court notes that the screen outputs
would be relevant as circumstantial evidence of copying.
Recognizing the Federal Rules of Evidence 401/403'5 relevancy pro-
bative value question involved in admitting evidence of the screen out-
151. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
152. Whelan II, 797 F.2d at 1243.
153. Id. at 1243 n.43 (emphasis added).
154. Id. (emphasis added).
155. Fed. R. of Evid. 401 provides:
"Relevant Evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
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puts, the court stated that "[t]he screen outputs must bear some relation
to the underlying program .... [and] therefore [pass] the low admis-
sibility threshold." 156
The court recognized that the real danger of allowing this form of
evidence to be admitted was the possibility of unfair prejudice.
[Tihe portions of the program that relate to the screen outputs
are often so small a part of the full program, that they might
say very little about the underlying program ... . [Blecause the
screen outputs are vivid and easily understood (at least as com-
pared with the obscure details of computer programs), they might
have a disproportionate influence on the trier of fact. 5 7
After acknowledging the "force" of this observation, the court points
out that the defendants did not object, nor could the court find any
objections in the record, to admission of testimony about screen simi-
larities.5 8 Applying the plain error rule, the court determined the ob-
jection to have been waived. 59 Then, giving substantial deference in the
review of the trial court's admission of evidence relating to the similarities
in the screen outputs, the appellate court found that the probative value
of this evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect, especially since the
defendants could "easily explain their (the screens') limited probative
value." '6
In retrospect, one must question whether or not the Court of Appeals
could be convinced by its own argument as to whether or not the screens
were unduly prejudicial. There was no jury in the trial. The trial court
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence.
Fed. R. of Evid. 403 provides in relevant part:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
the issues ....
156. Whelan II, 797 F.2d at 1244.
157. Id. at 1245.
158. Id.
159. Id. In dicta after this conclusion, the court decides that the "[s]creen outputs
are not so enticing that a trier of fact could not evaluate them rationally and with a
cool head." Id.
Yet, one cannot help but note the emphasis that pervades both the trial court and the
appellate court decisions on the lack of defendant's expert ever observing the program's
operation (i.e., looking at the screen outputs). This observation coupled with statements
by the court of the difficulty of understanding "details" of computer program and the
difficulty in weighing the expert testimony on this subject might lead one to consider
how well the court was able to avoid succumbing to the very prejudice that it denied.
160. Id.
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expressed the difficulty of assessing the credibility of the experts provided
by both sides. The trial court placed heavy emphasis on the screens'
similarity as circumstantial proof of "copying" and totally discounted
defendant's testimony as to similarities of the two source code programs,
the place where actual copying would be most aptly shown, because
"[h]e never observed the computer in operation nor viewed the various
screens."16'
The court next considered the similarity in five program "subrou-
tines" contained in the programs. 62 The trial court noted that "five
particularly important 'subroutines' within both programs-order entry,
accounts receivable, end of day procedure, and end of month proce-
dure-performed almost identically in both programs."'' 6 The appellate
court, on the other hand, simply responded to the defendant's complaint
that to decide the issue of substantial similarity by looking at only a
small portion of the complete work was erroneous and that the sub-
stantial similarity inquiry is a qualitative rather than quantitative inquiry.
The evidence in the trial court' presented no material issue as to the
nature or substance of the screens, except Dr. Moore's observations as
to the similarity in the flow of the information. 164
161. Whelan 1, 609 F. Supp. at 1321.
162. Whelan II, 797 F.2d at 1245. In Whelan II, id. at 1230 n.5, the court states
that "tlechnically speaking, modules and subroutines are slightly different .... For present
purposes, however, they may be used synonymously." This comment by the court viewed
in light of the footnote I comment equating the terms structure, sequence, and organization
(see supra note 105) evinces an attempt by this court to simplify the issues at hand to
a lowest possible denominator. As the discussion in Appendix A, infra, suggests, there
is a price to be paid When the law is applied with precision to terms of art absent
precision in their use.
A program module is a functional division of a program made by the program designer
for reasons of memory allocation, performance considerations, and logical division of the
functions which the program performs on a macro level. A subroutine, on the other
hand, is a small portion of program code, usually less than 50 lines of commands, that
performs a very specific function of the program, and is called from a large number of
locations within all the modules. Its purpose, aside from aiding the programmer to create
a logical, concise, and reliable program, is to avoid the repetition of an algorithm in
possibly hundreds of places in the code. An example of a module is Accounts Receivable.
An example of a subroutine is the computation of sales tax.
The granularity of the court's observations regarding similarity by measure of the
presence of these five "subroutines" is another reflection of the court's inability to grasp
the nature of the thing that was "copied." The court's factual finding of similarity based
on these five "subroutines" is comparable to a finding that the design of a Ford Pinto
infringes upon that of a Jaguar XJ-6 because each vehicle has four wheels, a steering
wheel, and an engine in the front compartment. Doubtless, there are hundreds if not
thousands of business type computer programs which by and large have these very five
"subroutines," or more properly called program modules. One cannot obtain any rea-
sonable inference of copying by comparison at such gross levels.
163. Whelan II, 797 F.2d at 1228.
164. Id. at 1246.
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The court noted in passing that it was "not convinced that progress
in computer technology or technique" would be inhibited by the im-
position of liability based upon similarity of "Look and Feel" because
"the progress in computer technology ... is [not] quantitatively different
from progress in other science and arts. 1' 65
One might ponder if this negative policy statement by which the
court justified the use of "Look and Feel" as a means of finding
copyright infringement was in fact correct. There are few arts or sciences
that have grown at the rate that computer technology has in the last
30 years. It is not unreasonable, in this author's opinion, to state that
the rapid progress that has occurred in the last thirty years in the
computer industry is probably indirectly, if not directly, responsible for
the progress made in the few other fields that have kept pace with the
progress with computer technology. If true, even in part, then the policy
basis upon which the Whelan court justified its expansive reading of
the Act risks creating a "chilling" effect on the industry that is driving
the pace of technology and science today. Chilling the industry surely
would be a complete contradiction to the express Article I, Section 8,
Clause 8 mandate "to promote the progress of science."
To declare sequence and order a copyrightable element of a computer
program seems to deny the purpose of the promotion of public good
via 'copyright. It would instantly result in a virtual monopoly to the
first person who creates a new but more efficient program. It would
force other program authors to use a less efficient method in their future
programs and would subject the users of such programs to the unending
nightmare of guaranteed program and data incompatibility at a loss of
untold man-hours and dollars. It is inconceivable that the framers of
the Constitution, having spent the twenty years before the writing of
the Constitution creating state copyright and patent laws, would have
intended such an absurd result from a clause inserted for the purpose
of promoting the advancement of science and the arts.
So where is the law after Whelan? We have Whelan that tells us
structure, sequence, and organization are copyrightable expressions of
an idea, or at the very least, useful as strong circumstantial evidence
of copyright infringement. On the other hand, the decision in Synercom
still maintains the idea/expression distinction as codified in Section 102(b)
of the Act. The United States Supreme Court has yet to take up a case
with a related issue. Thus, the question of whether either the Whelan
or Synercom rationale would prevail or if there may be another rationale
that can promote the proper balance of the conflicting interests still
awaits a definitive answer.
165. Id. at 1238. See infra text accompanying note 179.
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D. Some Other Cases
A brief look at some of the other cases involving computer program
copyright questions is in order at this point.
In Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp.,'6 Franklin
was enjoined from selling computers which contained Read Only Mem-
ories (ROMs) that were held to be copies of Apple's copyrighted pro-
grams based upon virtual identity of the object code in the ROMs.
Franklin did not dispute that it had literally copied the programs.
In Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World,'67 infringement of
an audio-visual copyright was found. Unison had negotiated with Brod-
erbund to develop a PC version of a Broderbund program. Unison had
access to the source code and worked on the program until negotiations
terminated. The Unison programmer was instructed to continue the
project but to add enhancements. Although ordered to stop copying the
original program, he was not ordered to delete the portion already
produced as a result of copying the Broderbund program.
In Data East USA, Inc. v. EPYX, Inc.,16s a finding of copyright
infringement was reversed by the Court of Appeals in a case involving
competing video karate games. The court reversed because the plaintiff
failed to prove access to the copyrighted work by the defendant. In
addition, the court found that if there was substantial similarity, this
similarity resulted from the idea of karate which was inseparable from
the expression. 69
In Digital Communications Associates, Inc. v. Softklone Distributing
Corp. ,170 the court found the defendant had infringed on the copyright
of Digital's program status screen. Softklone's versioj of this com-
munication program was purposefully designed based upon Digital's
program after the purchase of a commercially available version of the
original program and consultations with their attorney to determine the
portions of the original work that were copyrightable and thus, pro-
tected. 17'
166. 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033, 104 S.Ct. 690
(1984).
167. 648 F. Supp. 1127 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
168. 862 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 1988).
169. Note the similar judicial attitude to that accorded the "good faith" defendant
in Plains Cotton Co-Op v. Goodpasture Computer Service, Inc., 807 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir.),
reh'g denied, 813 F.2d 407, cert. denied, 484 U.S. 821, 108 S. Ct. 80 (1987).
170. 659 F. Supp 449 (N.D. Ga. 1987).
171. This case, among those where the defendant exhibited good faith, comes the
closest to being an example of a court misapplying the "substantial similarity" test to
achieve a "desired economic" result by using copyright law to achieve the exclusive
protection of the plaintiff's economic interests. See infra text accompanying notes 173-
74.
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In Plains Cotton Co-Op v. Goodpasture Computer. Services, Inc.,72
the court found no infringement because the "market" factor played a
significant role in determining the sequence and organization of the
program. It did not go unnoticed by the court that Goodpasture made
former Plains Cotton employees sign employment contracts promising
not to breach the confidences of their prior employer. In addition,
Goodpasture fired one 'employee who breached this promise and then
voluntarily and promptly expunged a portion of Goodpasture's competing
program derived from this employee's breach.
Plains Cotton Co-op and Data-East, as well as the dicta in Whelan
relating to the arguments the court felt could have been raised as to
the necessity for similarity in the file structures, 7 3 suggest that the courts
are indeed using the textual ambiguities and the lack of express Con-
gressional intent in its adoption of the CONTU recommendations to
protect the valid economic interests of authors of commercial computer
programs from bad faith use of protected works. The courts in Plains
Cotton Co-op and Data East could easily have used a Whelan type
analysis and found the defendants liable for infringement. In all of the
other cases cited, which cover a large portion of the computer cases
decided to date, the defendants were or appeared to be in bad faith.
The exception to this observation is Digital Communications As-
sociates, in which the court found infringement despite the defendant's
good faith efforts to avoid this problem by seeking legal advice in
advance. It is notable that Softklone's computer program, a modem
communications program, is alive and well in the 1990s, after creating
a status screen display that did not infringe on Digital's. The fact that
Softklone could rebound from this legal setback and continue with a
commercially viable product suggests that the status screen idea Softklone
imitated was not one of those fundamental ideas that occur from time-
to-time and that simply cannot be competed with in any other way than
by adoption. Were this not the case, then Digital's monopoly on this
type of screen would have precluded Softklone's success in this market.
II. CONCLUSION
The Copyright Act"" creates a statutory intellectual property mis-
appropriation "tort." Not unlike the common law of torts, the Act
serves two basic purposes in its protective aspects.' First, the Act's
172. 807 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1987). See, also, supra note 71 for some other thoughts
on Plains Cotton Co-op.
173. See supra text accompanying notes 152-54.
174. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988):
175. The Act also serves the purpose of protecting the author's economic interest in
his protected work by granting to him a limited-time monopoly on the reproduction of
the work. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1988).
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penalties for infringement serve the function of deterrence from partic-
ipation in conduct that is deemed harmful to the interests of society as
a whole and against public policy. By protecting the author's limited
monopoly to reproduce the work, the Act effectuates the promotion of
the public good that results from the advancement of the arts and
sciences.' 7 6 The second purpose of the Act is to make reparations for
the harm suffered by the author as a result of the actions of the
infringer. 7 7
Congress' express concern in the Act is the protection of the author's
rights. However, Congress implemented the Act as its expression of the
mandate of Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Consti-
tution, which gives Congress the power "[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and Useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discov-
eries."
The focus of the granted power is "[tio promote the Progress of
Science and the Useful Arts." This is an expression of the desire of
the Framers, based in large part in the state copyright struggles that
preceded the Constitution, to insure that the art and science necessary
for the growth of a new nation would be properly stimulated by economic
protection. 78 By framing the underlying purpose in the guise of pro-
tection for of the author's rights, Congress must have intended to
incorporate the concept that a violation that harms the public good is
the harm which triggers legal liability under the Act.
The tension between these two purposes, especially since the former
is effectuated by enforcing the latter, becomes most acute in the "Look
and Feel" cases where the alleged infringer may incur liability because
he inisjudged the "penumbra" of the copyright of the original work. 79
If there is a place for "Look and Feel" in such cases, the question
arises as to exactly what role it should play in the determination of
whether there has been an infringement.
Whelan and its progeny strongly suggest that the "Look and Feel"
aspect of a computer program is a copyrightable element of the program.
Synercom, Plains-Cotton, and Data-East take a narrower view, suggesting
that this aspect of a computer program may be copyrightable, but only
if the idea and expression are not merged. In fact, each of these cases
has really dealt with the issues of the value to be given to evidence of
176. U.S. Const. Art. I § 8 cl. 8.
177. 17 U.S.C. § 501 (1988).
178. G. Curtis, Treatise on the Law of Copyright 27-82 (1847); B. Bugbee, Genesis
of American Patent and Copyright Law 12 (1967).
179. Accord Digital Communications Associates, Inc. v. Softklone Distributing Corp.,
659 F. Supp 449 (N.D. Ga. 1987). See supra discussion of this "bad guess" case in the
text accompanying note 170.
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a substantial similarity of the "Look and Feel" of the two programs
in question and the proper allocation of the burden of persuasion. A
careful consideration of these two issues suggests an alternative use for
"Look and Feel."
Since the prima facie case'80 for copyright infringement and the tests
for the different stages in the litigation are jurisprudentially derived,
the courts should not follow the Whelan rationale of the end sought
test. Instead, upon findings that the alleged infringer had access to the
protected work and that there are substantial similarities in the two
works, the burden of persuasion as to the issue of infringement should
shift to the defendant. He should be allowed to carry his burden by
introducing credible evidence that the similarity was not the result of
any proscribed activity. Among the possible defenses that might be raised
as proof of this assertion are the Plains Cotton Co-op "market de-
manded" similar factors defense or the Synercom/Section 102(b)/Data
East inseparability of idea and expression defense. Or, the defendant
might simply provide proof that the program in question was developed
in a "clean room" environment in which access to the original protected
work was simply not possible."8 ' Such a shifting of the burden of
persuasion avoids the strained abstractions which Whelan and Synercom
exemplify, and fairly burdens the producer of a "similar work" to prove
the independent derivation of his product.
This proposed shifting of the burden of persuasion comports with
the realities of requiring the plaintiff to make a prima facie case against
the defendant and then to place the burden upon the party who has
exclusive control of any exculpatory evidence. Additionally, this process
avoids placing upon the plaintiff the double burden of making his prima
facie case against the defendant and then having to disprove all possible
"good defenses" that the defendant might simply plead if the burden
remains on the plaintiff. This shifting accommodates the underlying
purposes of the Act in that it protects the author's rights while avoiding
a copyright "monopoly" by elevating the "Look and Feel" to the status
of copyright material.
The result is a fair balance of the rights of an author of a computer
program to the economic benefits of his work, while allowing the industry
to continue to push forward the frontiers of science by building on the
ideas of yesterday. Restoration of this balance should, over a period of
180. See supra text accompanying notes 18-21.
181. The "clean room" defense is only likely to be successful in those rare cases
where the program is performing functions that are so fundamental or so restricted by
the computer programming language that there are very few ways to accomplish the task
efficiently. Such a defense has been suggested in a case involving an alleged infringement
of the internal program of a computer chip itself. NEC Corp. v. Intel Corp., (N.D. Cal.
Feb. 6, 1988) (1989 WL 67634).
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time, result in a reduction in litigation in this area of the law as the
cases define the allowable uses by programmers of portions of another's
program. This same development of a series of bright line 'rules' as to
the allowable degree of use will remove the current uncertainty in com-
puter program development, again resulting in the maximum contribution
of the industry in the promotion of science and the arts.
. Would the decisions in Whelan or Synercom be any different under
this analysis? In all probability, no. However, the difficult question of
deciding whether or not some user perceptible manifestation of the
program is a copyrightable element is avoided by using the showing of
a substantial similarity in the "Look and Feel" to simply shift the
burden of persuasion as described. The clear delineation of the criteria
that triggers the defendant's obligation to prove his exculpation will
result in fewer suits and in simpler litigation that does not need to resort
to arcane abstractions to answer the question of whether one has mis-
appropriated the expression of another.
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POSTSCRIPT
On June 28, 1990, Judge Robert E. Keeton rendered his decision
in Lotus Development Corp. v. Paperback Software International." 2
This postscript addresses only some brief comments on the opinion and
a more complete analysis will await another day. The crucial aspect of
the opinion is its thoroughness of analysis, its adoption of the Whelan
rationale with some modifications and its express rejection of the Sy-
nercom rationale.
In a lengthy and scholarly opinion, Judge Keeton considers the
statutory language of the 1976 and 1980 amendments to the Copyright
Act, the CONTU Report, legislative intent, and policy derived from
consideration of the grant of power to Congress in Article 1, section
8, clause 8.183 He reiterated the conclusion that Congress intended to
incorporate the idea-expression distinction in the Act,' as amended. 8 4 He
also concluded that the intention of Congress was to protect more than
the literal expression of a computer program, i.e. the source and object
code. ""5
Judge Keeton derives a test that is a variation of the Whelan unique
expression test.8 6 However, Judge Keeton adds a gloss to the test in
an attempt to distinguish an idea that is inseparable from the expression
of the idea. "When a particular expression goes no farther than the
obvious, it is inseparable from the idea itself. Protecting an expression
of this limited kind would effectively amount to protection of the idea
.... " 87 With no allusions to patent law, in which non-obviousness is
a statutory requirement, Judge Keeton has conflated obviousness with
inseparability of idea and expression, thereby adding a jurisprudential
requirement for copyrightability of a computer program. Judge Keeton
acknowledges the potential harm of software monopolies,' 8 but under
the analysis he provides, it will be the rare program that cannot meet
his test of copyrightability.
In addition, Judge Keeton faced the same problem in Lotus that
the court faced in Whelan, in that the disputed element, here the user
interface, was not the subject of a copyright registration certificate.8 9
Recognizing this problem, Judge Keeton, after finding that the user-
interface in this case was copyrightable, then found, of necessity, that
the copyright certificates covered this element.
182. 740 F. Supp. 37 (D. Mass. 1990).
183. Id. at 45-53.
184. Id. at 53-54.
185. Id. at 46.
186. Id. at 59-61
187. Id. at 58-59.
188. Id. at 52-53.
189. Id. at 79-80.
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.However, in doing so, he rejected the notion the copyright protection
of computer program extended to the screen displays, per se. "[Clopying
of h program's screen displays, without evidence of copying of the
program's source code, object code, sequence, organization, or structure,
does not state a claim of infringement."'190
The decision is troubling in that it continues, in this author's opinion,
imprudently to pave the road to a jurisprudential rule that grants effective
software monopolies. The decision is encouraging in that the insightful
analysis may give the next court a clue as to the proper method to
balance the competing interest of "public good" and protection of
authors' rights.
Richard D. Moreno
190. Id. at 80.
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APPENDIX A
EXAMPLE OF FORTRAN INPUT CARD FORMAT
The first sixteen characters of a card image might appear as follows:
100ABCDEFG123.12X34xyzle-10
It is unlikely that the lay observer would derive any useful information
from this seemingly random combination of letters and numbers.
However, to the trained observer, especially one who had access to
the user manuals for the program as did EDI, the input format card
is clearly a series of definitions as follows:
31 - a three character length Integer numeric field.
7H - a seven character length Alphanumeric (Hollerith) field.
5F2 - a 7 character Floating-point numeric field with two digits
to the right of the decimal point.
lI-a one character length Integer numeric field.
3H-a three character length Alphanumeric (Hollerith) field.
4E2-a 6 character base-10 Exponentiated numeric field with a
two digit exponent.
These specifications define that portion of the sample input card
format for each of these variable fields regardless of the value the user
wishes to enter. The defining information is derived independently of
the actual numbers or letters used on the card.
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"SINGLE REGISTRATION RULE"
This is not to say that the user 'perceptible manifestations of a
computer program may not be copyrighted. In fact, since Whelan, the
Copyright Office has issued regulations for the so-called "single-regis-
tration" rule that allows a single registration to cover all copyrightable
aspects of a computer program. 32 C.F.R. Sec. 202, effective June 10,
1988; 53 F.R. 21817-01 (June 10, 1988) (emphasis added).
This interesting language, "all copyrightable aspects," could open
much room for litigation over what aspects of a program may be
copyrightable, an inquiry that leads one immediately into the idea-
expression dichotomy. This new rule, however, is a factor only if the
courts give the Copyright Office regulation deference in the copyright
infringement cases.
EXCERPTS FROM THE PROMULGATION OF THE
"SINGLE REGISTRATION RULE;'
In the promulgation of the final rule by the Office of Copyright
in 53 F.R. 21817-01, the following comments were made as to the
relationship of the single registration rule and current jurisprudence:
Most claimants, consistent with Copyright Office regulations,
have made only one registration for the computer program and
have assumed that the registration covers any copyrightable au-
thorship in the screen displays, without any need for a separate
registration. The Copyright Office agrees with this interpretation
of the regulations and registration practices.
Judicial decisions do not yet lend clear guidance on the
copyrightability of screen displays (other than videogame dis-
plays), apart from the computer program .... The Softkione
decision, if followed would seem to require a separate claim to
copyright in screen displays in order to enjoy copyright protec-
tion. This decision seemed to cast doubt on the scope of cop-
yright in computer programs where no separate registration was
made for the screen displays.
The Office finds that in the interest of a clear, consistent
public record, our regulation practices should discourage piece-
meal registration of parts of a work ....
It is clear from the Copyright Office's explanation of the purpose
of the single-registration rule that the Office is making a regulatory
ruling that is not intended to preclude the decision by a court as to
1990]
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what aspects of the work submitted under the single registration rule
will ultimately be found to be copyrightable aspects of the work. The
rule is clearly stated for purposes of administrative ease and is not
related to the ongoing debate over the nature of order and sequence as
copyrightable elements.
